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Abstract
We propose a way to retrieve the secure key generated by the co-
herent one way protocol without reading the information transmitted
on the quantum channel.
1 Introduction
The coherent one way (COW) protocol [1] is specifically designed for quantum
key distribution (QKD) [2] between two distant partners, traditionally called
Alice and Bob. It is not suitable for data transfer and this is intentional.
Bob in principle can receive only very few of the bits sent by Alice for the
key construction. Moreover, the received bits are randomly chosen from the
transmitted ones. Therefore, if an eavesdropper, say Eve, wants to know
the entire key generated by Alice and Bob, she has to be able to detect
all bits transmitted by Alice. In other words, there has to be data transfer
from Alice to Eve, something which is specifically designed not to be possible
under COW protocol.
The protocol is tested against several types of eavesdropping attacks [1, 3]
most of them being variants of the photon number splitting (PNS) attack
[4, 5]. Here our approach to attack COW protocol is different. Eve does
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not detect anything. She only restricts (in a controlled way) the information
received by Bob. Finally, she is able to retrieve the generated key from the
public information exchange between Alice and Bob.
2 COW protocol
According to COW protocol [1] the partners are connected by two channels:
a “classical channel” and a “quantum channel”. The difference between
both channels is that it is possible to read the information on the classical
one without distorting it, while the reading of information on the quantum
channel alters it.
The classical channel is two directional. It is used prior the transmission
on the quantum channel in order to synchronize Alice’s and Bob’s clocks.
After the transmission (of the information via the quantum channel) the
classical channel is used by Bob to reveal the successive number of the bits
he have received, and by Alice to pick which bits from the received ones to be
made public for verification and which to be used in the key. Alice announces
as well some special time moments to be checked for coherence.
The quantum channel is one directional, from Alice to Bob. Alice gen-
erates random bit sequence (raw key information, or just information) and
uses pulse modulation to transmit it. In other words, any information bit
(IB) is encoded as two pulses, or transmission bits (TBs), each with fixed
duration τ . The TB 0trans is represented by a time bin where no photons
are transmitted and 1trans is represented by a time bin with µ mean photon
number and with Poisson photon number distribution in it. In other words
0trans = |0〉
1trans = |µ〉 = e−µ/2
∑
n=0
µn/2√
n!
|n〉, (1)
where |n〉 is the normalized state with n photons. The encoding used by
COW protocol is:
0info → 10trans
1info → 01trans, (2)
where the left transmission bit is transmitted first. The encoding (2) ensures
that Bob detects with equal probability 0info and 1info provided his detector
is noiseless or without dead time.
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According to COW protocol Bob determines the value of a received IB by
the time he detects a photon. For instance, if the transmission starts at t = 0
and if Bob detects a photon in the time interval T ∈ (2(n − 1)τ, (2n − 1)τ)
he knows that this is the n-th successive IB and its value is 0info.
Occasionally, Alice transmits the so called decoy sequence 11trans. This
sequence (which presents in 10info as well) is used to detect PNS attack. For
this purpose Bob randomly selects a fraction (1 − tB)  1 of the incoming
photons which are directed not to Bob’ data detector but to an unbalanced
interferometer tuned for destructive interference of 11trans. The interference
picture is monitored by a detector and if the key generation is subjected
to PNS attack which destroys the 11trans coherence this detector will fire.
Note, that most of the decoy sequences (about tB(2 − tB) of them) do not
pass through the interferometer, but through Bob’s data detector and those
which are detected are misinterpreted by Bob as 0info or 1info. The reason is
that Bob can not detect two consecutive TBs because of detector dead time.
These errors are corrected during the Alice and Bob dialog on the classical
channel.
It follows from Eqs.(1) that |0〉 and |µ〉 are not orthogonal
〈0|µ〉 = e−µ/2 6= 0, (3)
and therefore, Bob, and Eve as well, can misinterpret 1trans as 0trans. This
fact puts limitation on the usage of COW protocol for data exchange, because
in the protocol µ = 0.5. As it is seen from Fig.1 this is not the only possible
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Figure 1: Solid line: The fraction of the transmitted 1trans which can be detected
with an ideal single photon detector (i.e. they are with photon number ≥ 1) as a
function of mean photon number µ in the pulse. Dashed line: the fraction of the
detectable 1trans which can be split (i.e. with photon number ≥ 2).
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choice with smaller µ trading speed for security. In fact smaller µ is indeed
used — because of the quantum channel transmission coefficient t < 1 (for
large distances between Alice and Bob t  1) and the facts that Bob send
only a fraction tB < 1 of incoming photons to his data detector which is with
quantum efficiency η  1 the effective mean photon number at Bob’s side is
much smaller than the initial one at Alice’s side
µeff = µ t tB η  µ. (4)
Note that the minimal µeff for which the protocol can work depends entirely
on Bob’s data detector noise. Surely, smaller µeff means lower key generation
rate. If we take into account the detector dead time this rate will be reduced
further, in some cases — by several orders of magnitude.
In the practical setups [6, 7] Alice prepares the transmission sequence
using adjustable continuous wave laser and intensity modulator. Alice mon-
itors the laser power continuously to ensure µ = 0.5. The pulse duration is
τ ≈ 2.4ns. The modulator transmits the laser light during 1trans and blocks
it completely during 0trans. The fraction of incoming photons directed to
Bob’s data detector is tB = 0.9. There are two reported algorithms for gen-
eration of the decoy sequence: (a) the decoy sequence substitutes substring
1010info whenever it appears in the raw key information [7], or (b) there is a
decoy sequence at the start of every 8 TBs [6]. Fortunately, as we shall see
in the next section, the exact mechanism for decoy state generation is not
important for the proposed attack.
3 The attack
The proposed attack is based on the COW feature that Bob receives only
small fraction of the information transmitted by Alice. We suppose that Eve
has full access to the information on the classical channel. So, her clock is
synchronized with Alice’s and Bob’s ones and she is aware which are the
successive number of the IBs received by Bob and which of them have been
used for the key.
The attack on the quantum channel is performed synchronously with the
information transmission from Alice to Bob. Eve does not try to read this
information, because this will be detected, but altered it. For this purpose
she generates her own random1 bit sequence, translates it into transmission
1In fact the sequence may be just 101010 . . ..
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Alice Eve Bob
IB TBs IB TBs received bits IB
0 10 0 10 10 0
0 10 1 01 00 n.d.
1 01 0 10 00 n.d.
1 01 1 01 01 1
d.s. 11 0 10 10 0
d.s. 11 1 01 01 1
Table 1: The result of Eve’s attack is in Bob’s columns. Here, “d.s.” stands for
decoy state, and “n.d.” is for not defined state.
sequence, and synchronously applies bitwise AND operation between this
sequence and the signal on the quantum channel. In the practical setups
this can be done by an intensity modulator, analogous to the one used by
Alice. As a result (see Table 1) with 50% probability any IB generated by
Alice passes trough Eve unchanged, and with 50% probability it becomes
the sequence 00trans which is not defined but is highly expected in COW
protocol. All decoy sequences are destroyed and substituted by 01trans or
10trans sequences. As it has been explained above, Bob always misinterprets
the detected decoy sequences, so their substitution with 0info or 1info can
not be noticed.
The crucial moment of the attack is that Bob can detect only these IBs
generated by Alice which coincide with the generated by Eve ones.
At the end of the transmission Bob announce on the classical channel the
sequential number of the IBs he has received. This is the moment in which
Eve effectively detects the information received by Bob, because she knows
the time sequence of her own bits. The next steps performed by Alice and
Bob are completely classical and public, so at the final Eve will have a copy
of their key.
4 Conclusions
We propose a completely classical attack on COW protocol for QKD in which
Eve does not try to detect anything on the quantum channel. She only
superpose her own information upon the transmitted one. Eve is able to
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retrieve the shared key only after the end of quantum communication, on
the base of the data sent between Alice and Bob via the classical channel.
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